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Where two several creditors simultaneously attach a debtor's real estate, consisting of an equity of redemption, as between themselves an undivided half thereof becomes holden as attached on each writ, and the equity may be sold in moieties upon executions recovered upon such writs, one unlivided half upon each
execution, where neither moiety is sold upoi the execution for a sum exceeding
the amount due thereon.
Where an officer in his return of a sale of an equity upon execution declares
that he published in acertain newspaper the notice which the statute requires to
be given, it is not competent for the debtor, or any one claiming under him, to contradict the officer's return by the production of such newspaper, showing the return
to be untrue.
There is no legal necessity of returning to the clerk's office, within any definite
time, the execution upon which an equity has been sold by an officer, in order to
make the sale valid as against a subsequent purchaser.. The registry of deeds
(by statute) discloses the state of the title in such case.
BILL IN EQUITY, to redeem a farm in Gorham, from a mortgage
by Merrill W. Mosher to one David D. Thorn and his assigns, to
secure the payment of $2500, in one year from date, -May 1st 1871,
with interest ; the right of redemption having been assigned to the
complainant by Mosher, by his deed of March 80th 1874.
The bill set out that at the October term 1873, the mortgagee,
Thorn, recovered a conditional judgment against Mosher, for
$2760.20 debt, and $31.86 costs; that Thorn assigned this judgment to Emery, January 19th 1874, who, on failure of payment of
the judgment, April 22d 1874, sued out an alias writ of possession,
whereby Emery was put into full possession of the mortgaged premises, on May 14th 1874; that the plaintiff, as assignee of Mosher,
delivered to Emery a request in writing for a true account; and
that Emery refused to comply therewith. The bill closed with a
prayer that Emery, Thorn and Libby be required to answer, and
that she be permitted to redeem, and for other relief.
The defendant, Emery, admitted the foregoing facts. But set
up in defence, that on July 9th 1874, the time of the admitted demand, the complainant bad no right to make it or to redeem; that
on March 7th 1872, the right in equity of Mosher to redeem was
attached simultaneously on two several writs, in two suits, on that
day commenced against him and returnable to the superior court,
one in favor of him, the said Emery, and the other in favor of his
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co-defendant, Libby, and in each judgment was recovered by the
respective plaintiffs at the April term 1873, and executions issued,
on each of which a deputy sheriff, May 17th .1873, seized an undivided moiety of said Mosher's right in equity, and after due proceedings had, on June 27th 1873, to satisfy said two executions, sold
both of said undivided moieties, one on each execution, to the said
Libby, and on the same day executed to him two several deeds
thereof, whereby Libby became seised and the lawful owner of the
whole of said Mosher's right in equity to redeem, subject only to
the right of said Mosher or his assigns to redeem from the sales
on said executions within one year thereafter, and that the year
expired June 7th 1874, and Libby then became the absolute owner
of the whole of the equity.
F. 0. J. Smith,"for the complainant, contended that there was no
statute authorizing an officer to seize and sell by auction on execution, a moiety or any fractional part of a debtor's right to redeem
his real estate from a mortgage; that the purchaser cannot compel
a mortgagee to relinquish any part of his mortgage security, short
of the whole, and only on payment of the full amount of the mortgage debt; nor can a party, by the purchase of one part, acquire
the right to redeem an encumbrance on another part.
A creditor may, at his own hazard of removing by agreement
existing encumbrances, levy upon a fractional part of his debtor's
mortgaged real estate by metes and bounds, as was 'done in the case
of FranklinBank v. Blossom, 23 Maine 546 ; but he cannot have
the encumbrance deducted from his appraisement, as is, virtually
7 ds,
done by selling an entire equity of redemption: Warren v. -h(2
11 Mass. 222.
The statute points out the mode of reaching the debtor's interest:
Rev. Stats., c. 76, § 29, and c. 87, § 21; and does not auth rize the
sale of numerous equities for one sum, nor the reduction of an equity
to.less than an entirety and the sale of a fractional part, and the imposing upon it the entire encumbrance.
Counsel contended and argued elaborately and at length that the
equity could not be split; and under various positions taken cited,
besides some of the cases appearing in the opinion, the following:
Bacon v. Leonard, 4 Pick. 277; Shove v. -Dow, 13 Mass. 529;
Allyn v. Burbank, 9 Conn. 151 ; Young v. Williams, 17 Id. 393 ;
Jessup v. Batterson, 5 Day (Conn.) 371; Franklinv. Gorham, 2
Id. 149.
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G. B. Emery, for the defendants.
A debtor can convey one moiety of his equity to one person and
the other to another by one deed, or by separate deeds. If he should
convey the whole equity to one and the whole equity to another at
precisely the same time by deeds recorded simultaneously, the
grantees would take in moieties. The same is the result of a statute
conveyance by the officer.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
'PETERS, J.-The main question to be decided is, whether an
equity of redemption can be sold in separate portions or shares, by
an officer, upon different executions, under the particular circumstances existing in this case. The precise question preselted has
never before arisen in any report, d case in this.state, nor has it been
decided elsewhere, under a statutory system like our own, that we
are aware of.
Two several creditors made simultaneous attachments upon a
debtor's real estate. The property attached turned out to be an
equity of redemption. By virtue of the attachments, upon executions afterwards obtained, the equity was sold in moieties at the
same time to the same bidder by the officer holding both executions,
one undivided half thereof upon one execution and the other half
upon the other. Can the sales be upheld ? We think they can.
If not, then the circumstance that the attachments were made at
the same time renders them both void. Attachments made at the
same instant stand upon an equal footing. Neither can exclude the
other. Each covers the whole estate as far as the debtor is concerned, and one-half thereof as between each other; where neither
moiety is appraised upon execution for a sum exceeding the amount
due thereon: Fairfieldv. Paine,23 Me. 498; Durant v. Johnson,
19 Pick. 544.
The complainant relies upon several authorities to show the sales
to be void. We think the position taken is not sustained by the
cases cited.
In Stone v. Bartlett, 46 Maine 438, it was held that several
distinct equities could not be sold upon execution together for a
gross sum, but should be sold separately. The same decision is
repeated in the case of Smith v. Dow, 51 Maine 21. Fletcher
v. Stone, 3 Pick. 250, decides the same question in the same way.
The reason of the decision in those cases is, that a debtor has the
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right of redeeming one equity without redeeming the other. No
such reason can apply in this case.
In Chapman v. Androseoggin, Railroad, 54 Maine 160, it was
determined that our statutes do not permit the sale of an equity of
redemption upon two or more executions jointly in favor of two
creditors. Undoubtedly, such a proceeding was awkward and
illogical in the extreme. Nor was there any necessity for it in that
ease. There the attachments were successive in point of time and
not simultaneous. The equity could have been sold on one execution under the provisions of our statutes: Rev. Stats., c. 84,
§ 21. But here it is different. The equity could not be sold on
one execution, because one-half of the equity only could be held
as attached thereon. It became necessary to provide a way to make
such sales as would save both attachments and make them effectual.
The distinction between that case and this is a marked one, and
the reasons upon which the conclusion in that case must rest,
although having some appearance of it, are not really pertinent to
such a state of facts as is presented here.
While we do not regard the foregoing cages as militating against,
there are several cases which by their force and effect strongly
support our present view. In .ranklin Bank v. Blossom, 23
Maine 546, it was decided that where land situated in two adjoining towns is included in the same mortgage, an officer may sell the
right of redeeming the land within one of the towns only. That
decision approaches to the proposition sought to be established in
this case, very nearly. If an officer could sell what was in one
town on one execution, he might sell what was in the other town
upon another execution, and the different creditors could resort to a
court of equity to settle the matter between them. The comlainant thinks that Bank v. Blossom stands upon doubtful ground.
But we do not perceive that its force has been broken by any of
the later decisions.
The case of Durant v. Johnson, 8upra, is quite in point. In
that case there were simultaneous attachments, by two creditors, of
the same parcel of land. One creditor levied upon the whole land,
acquiring thereby a title to but a moiety of the land as against the
other creditor. Therefore, an undivided moiety remained for the
other creditor. By the law of Massachusetts (same as here) a creditor ordinarily could levy only by metes and bounds upon an estate
held by the debtor in severalty. But the latter creditor, to relieve
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himself from the predicament he was in, levied upon an undivided
share of the land, and the levy was declared to be good. The
court there say': ."There is no statute provision declaring the
effect of simultaneous attachments, or directing the mode of levying executions in such cases, but the court have applied to the cases
that have occurred such legal principles as wbuld most effectually
do justice to the conflicting claims of creditors, without violating
any existing laws." See Sigourney v. Eaton, 14 Pick. 414, and
Irerr v. Richardson, 5 Allen 107.
Upon principle, we think these proceedings should be sustained.
We do not go so far as to say that an attachment and a sale of a
part of an equity would be valid, when the whole is as open to
attachment as any part of it. We confine our decision to the. facts
of this case. No injury need be suffered by the debtor, by selling
his equity in this way. It may be an advantage to him. He can
redeem from one sale and forego a redemption of the other, if he
desires to. It is urged that a sale in two halves, by splitting the
equity, would not bring so much money as a sale of the entirety
would. That is not evident. But, if it was, any liability to loss
could be .avoided by the debtor, by redeeming from the sales, and
less money would be required to enable him to do so. The pur.chaser holds the land subject td"the mortgage:. If the debtor
redeems from both sales, his property is restored to him. If he
redeems from one sale only, he becomes a tenant in common with
the purchaser, subject to the mortgage. The debtor would then
be in the same condition as he would be had he conveyed an undivided half of the land to the creditor, subject to the mortgage.
That would be by no means an uncommon relation of parties in
an ownership of an estate, and it might be brought about in several ways. Should the debtor, as a tenant in common, redeem the
estate by paying up the entire mortgage, he would have an equitable lien upon the half not his own, for the sum he may advance
upon it. Nor is there any contingency affecting the - situation of
the debtor which would debar his interests from a reasonable and
sufficient protection: Smith v. Kelley, 27 Maine'237 ; Bailey v.
Myrick, 36 Id. 50.
The complainant, arguendo, says that an article of personal
property cannot be sold on execution in common and undivided
shares. But it. can be, if the debtor owns in it only an undivided
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share. And in such a case the debtor's situation would exceedingly
resemble the position of the debtor here.
The complainant next contended that the notice of sale given by
the officer, as published in the "Portland Argus," was not a legal
and sufficient notice. But this point is not open to the complainant. If it was admitted by the respondents to have been the
notice in fact given, the point would have been open. But the
respondents refuse to admit it, and rely upon the return of the officer,
that he gave due and legal ndtice, as conclusive. The sworn
return of the officer is conclusive. The rule is very general. The
exceptions are very rare, and this case is not one of them : Blanchard v. Day, 31 Me. 494, 496; Grover v. Howard, Id. 546;
Huntress v. Tiney, 39 Id. 237; Bunker v. Gilmore, 40 Id. 88;
Dutton v. Simmons, 65 Id. 583; Pullen v. Haynes, 11 Gray 379.
In Sykes v. Keating, 118 Mass. 517,. the officer's return set out
that the notice of the sale was of land on Union street in a city,
and it was held that evidence that in the published notice of sale
the premises were described as situated on Avon street was not
competent to contradict the return. The remedy would be against
the officer for a false return. We do not mean to intimate, however, that the published notice in the present case is not a perfeetly good one. On the contrary, we do not now perceive any
valid objection to it. It seems to be in the common form, as laid
down in the books of forms for officers' proceedings. It is objected that the whole equity, was a4vertised for sale upon each
execution. So was the whole equity attached on each writ. The
notice was proper enough as far as that point is concerned. Non
constat, that the attachments would be in the way of each other
when the day of sale should arrive. One of them might be paid
or released or waived. The debtor was not prejudiced upon that
ground to any extent whatever. The case of Boche v. Farnsworth,
106 Mass. 509, cited by complainant, does not apply.
Another objection is raised against the validity of the respondents'
title. It appears that upon one of the executions, besides the sale
thereon of one-half of the equity, a levy was also made, other real
estate having been taken in satisfaction of a part of the execution.
The execution with all the returns thereon was left with the register
of deeds, to have the levy recorded. The register, very improperly
for his own convenience in copying, cut the papers annexed to the
execution apart; and when the execution was lodged with the clerk,
VOL. XXVI.-21
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after the extent was recorded, the part of the papers containing the
officer's doings in making sale of the equity was missing. The
officer afterwards got the papers together and restored them to their
original shape. Ie is accused of making an illegal amendment by
so doing. But his act merely had the effect of preventing an
amendment or alteration, or a diminution of his return.
The point stated by the complainant is that the execution,
although returned to the clerk's office, had no officer's return of the
sale of the half of the equity thereon until after three months from
the time it -was issued, nor until after the equity was conveyed by
the debtor to the complainant. The answer is, that there was no
legal necessity of returning the execution to the clerk's office within
any definite time, in order to make the sale of the *equity valid as
against a subsequent purchaser. The registry of deeds discloses
the state of the title: Rev. Stats., c. 76, § 33 ; Ingersoll v. Sauyer,
2 Pick. 276 ; Prescott v. Pettee, 3 Id. 331 ; Gorham v. Blazo, 2
Me. 232.; Emerson v. Towle, 5 Id. 197 ; Clark v. Poxcroft, 6 Id.
296.
It becomes unnecessary to consider the other questiois discussed
on the briefs of counsel.
Bill dismissed, with costs to respondents.
APPLETON, C. J., WALTON,

BARRoWS,

DANFOTr

and

intox,

JJ., concurred.
This case, though in a new aspect,
seems in conformity with well-established principles. An officer, selling
under an execution, executes a power;
he acts as agent-agent in law-to
transfer the debtor's title. The same
rules which govern a debtor's own conveyance apply likewise to an officer's
conveyance for him. On the one hand,
the officer is governed by the inme
restrictions as the debtor himself. If by
law the debtor could not convey directly
to his -yife, the officer, for the same
reason, cannot ; and the wife who bought
would acquire no title: tetson v. O'Sullivan, 8 Allen 321 (1864). On the
other hand, the officer, unless restricted
by statute, may convey, by levy or sale,
in the same manner as the debtor himself could. And as it is clear that

when a person makes two simultaneous
deeds of the same land to two separate
persons, which are delivered and recorded at the same time, each grantee
takes a moiety as tenant in common:
,13 Mass. 529; Young v. DeDouhl, 11
Rich. Law 638; "CJallefouxv. Duchanje,
8 Wis. 287 ; or where a testator devises
the same land to two 'different persons
in fee, in separate clauses of the same
will, the same esullt follows : 1 Jarm.
on Wills 446 , 1 Redf. on. Wills 443;
Showat v. Bcntley, 2 M. &,K. 166,
Lord BROUGHAM; there seems to be
no reason why the same effect should
not be given to the deed of an officer,
which is but a mere statutory conveyance
from the debtor himself. Therefore it
was early held in Massachusetts, that
if two creditors simultaneously attach
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the same land of their debtor, and duly
set-off the same by extent on their executions, each creditor takes a moiety of the
land so levied upon, on the ground
that "when two men have each a title
to the same piece of land, which is apparently perfect, and by which either
might hold the whole, but for an equally
good title in the other, they must each
take a moiety :" S7ove v. Dow, 13 Mass.
529 (1816) ; Sigourney v. Eaton, 14
Pick. 414 (1833); Durant v. Johnson,
19 Id. 544 (1837); Perry v. Adams, 3
Metc. 51 (1841).
In this laskcase one
creditor levied his execution on the
whole by metes dnd bounds, it not
being sufficient to satisfy the whole
execution. The other simultaneously
levied his upon 14-15ths of an undivided
half of the whole, which was to the
extent of his demand. The latter was
held to be tenant in common with the
former in the whole; i. e., he held
14-15ths of the undivided half, and not
7-15ths only.
The same rule is recognised in sales
of personal property on executions.
Thus, in. (aur.pbell v. Ruqer, I Cow.
215, two executions were levied on the
same personal property, at the same
time, and, on being sold on execution,
each creditor bid off different portions
of the property at different sums. It
was held that all the money was to be
applied equally to both executions, until
the smaller execution was fully satisfied, and the balance upon the larger
execution until that was fully paid,
if sufficient. See also Nutter v. Connet,
3 B. Monroe 204 ; Lee v. lRinman, 6
Conn. 170.
The same rule applies to attachments
by the trustee process. If an officer at
the same time serve two trustee writs
against the sable defendant and the

same trustee, but for different creditors,
each creditor holds an equal part of the
funds in the trustee's hands, and not in
proportion to the amount of their respective claims: oCkwd.o I v. Vrarnum,
17 l'ick. 289 ; Davis v. Dars, 2 Cash.
111. There is no apparent reason why
the same rule should not apply to an
officer's sale of an equity of redemption
on two executions simultaneously. If
the equity is bought by a third person,
the proceeds are equally divided between
the creditors, or if the creditors themselves bid off the equity, they hold in
the same proportion. See 71urston v.
Huntington, 17 N. H. 438 (1845) ; Si,
gourney v. Eaton, supra.
Whether the whole equity should be
sold on one execution, and the proceeds
divided between tile creditors equally,
or whether each creditor may sell an
undivided moiety on his own execution,
as was done in tile leading case, seems
to be a question between themselves,
rather than as between them and the
debtor. He would not be prejudiced by
a separate sale. If it sold for less because of the separate sales, he could the
more easily redeem. If it sold for more,
it would pay so much more of his debt,
and perhaps produce a surplus for himself. Quacunque via he ought not to
complain.
In some states the proceeds in cases
of simultaneous attachments are not divided equally among tile attaching creditors, but pro rata to their claims : Porter v. Eartihman, 4 Yerg. 358 ; Love v.
Harper, 4 Humph. 113; Hil! v. Child,
3 Dev. 265 ; Freeman v. Grist, I Dev. &
Bat. 217; Wilcox v. Mlay, 19 Ohio 408.
See further on this subject, Drake on
Attachments, p. 263; Herman on Executions, p. 274.
EDMUND H. BENNETT.
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Supreme Court of tte United States.
HANNIBAL AND ST. JOSEPH RAILROAD CO. v. JOHN P. HUSEN.
The police power of a state cannot be exercised over a subject, such as interstate
transportation of objects of commerce, confided exclusively to Congress by the
federal constitution.
While a state may enact sanitary laws, while, for the purpose of self protection,
it may establish quarantine and reasonable inspection regulations, while it may
prevent persons and animals suffering under contagious or infectious diseases from
entering the state, it cannot interfere with transportation into or through its borders,
beyond what is absolutely necessary for its self-protection.
A statute of a state which prohibits driving or conveying any Texas, Mexican,
or Indian cattle into the state between the 1st day of March and the 1st day of December in each year, is unconstitutional, because in conflict with the clause of the
constitution of the United States that ordains "Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states ana with the
Indian tribes." Such a statute is not a legitimate exercise of the police power of
the state. It is more than a quarantine regulation.
Neither the unlimited powers of a state to tax, nor any of its large police powers,
can be exercised to such an extent as to work a practical assumption of the powers
conferred by the constitution upon Congress.
Since the range of a state's police power comes very near to the field committed
by the constitution to Congress, it is the duty of courts to guard vigilantly against
any needless intrusion.

WRIT OF ERtOR to the Supreme Court of Missouri. The facts
appear in the opinion of the court, which was delivered by
STRONG, J.-Five assignments of error appear in this record;
but they raise only a single question. It is whether the statute of
Missouri, upon which the action in the state court was founded, is
in conflict with the clause of the constitution of the United States
that ordains "Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with
foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian
tribes." The statute, approved January 28d 1872, by its first
section, enacted as follows : "No Texas, Mexican, or Indian cattle
shall be driven or otherwise conveyed into or remain in any county
in this state between the 1st day of March and the 1st day of November in each year, by any person or persons whatsoever." A
later section is in these words: "If any person or persons shall
bring into this state any Texas, Mexican, or Indian cfttle, in violation of the first section of this act, he or they shall be liable in all
cases for all damages sustained on account of disease communicated
by said cattle." Other sections make such bringing of cattle into
the state a criminal offence, and provide penalties for it. It was,
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however, upon the provisions we have quoted that this action was
brought against the railroad company that had conveyed the cattle
into the county. It is noticeable that the statute interposes a direct
prohibition against the introduction into the state of all Texas, Mexican, or Indian cattle, during eight months of each year, without
any distinction between such as may be diseased and such as are
not. It is true a proviso to the first section enacts that "when
such cattle shall come across the line of the state, loaded upon a
railroad car or steamboat, and shall pass through the state without
being unloaded, such shall not be construed as prohibited by the
act; but the railroad company or owners of a steamboat performing
such transportation shall be responsible for all damages which may
result from the disease called the Spanish or Texas fever, should
the same occur along the line of transportation; and the existence
of such disease along the line of such route shall be prima facie
evidence that such disease has been communicated by such transportation." This proviso imposes burdens and liabilities for transportation through the state, though the cattle be not unloaded, while
the body of the section absolutely prohibits the introduction of any
such cattle into the state, with the single exception mentioned.
It seems hardly necessary to argue at length, that, unless the
statute can be justified as a legitimate exercise of the police power
of the state, it is an usurpation of the power vested exclusively in
Congress. It is a plain regulation of interstate commerce, a regulation extending to prohibition. Whatever may be the power of a
state over commerce that is completely internal, it can no more
prohibit or regulate that which is interstate than it can that which
is with foreign nations. Power over one is given by the constitution of the United States to Congress in the same words in which
it is given over the other, and in both cases it is necessarily exclusive. That the transportation of property from one state to another
is a branch of interstate commerce is undeniable, and no attempt
has been made in this case tb deny it.
The Missouri statute is a plain interference with such transportation, an attempted exercise over it of the highest possible powerthat of destruction. It meets at the borders of the state a large
and common subject of commerce, and prohibits its crossing the
state line during two-thirds of each year, with a proviso, however,
that such cattle may come across the line loaded upon a railroad
car or steamboat, and pass through the state without being unloaded.
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But even the right of steamboat owners and railroad companies to
traisport such property through the state is loaded by the law with
onerous liabilities because of their agency in the transportation.
The object and effect of the statute axe, therefore, to obstruct interstate commerce, and to discriminate between the property of citizens
of one state and that of citizens of other states. This court has
heretofore said that interstate transportation of passengers is beyond
the reach of a state legislature. And if, as we have held, state
taxation of persons passing from one state to another, or a state tax
upon interstate transportation of passengers, is. prohibited by the
constitution because a burden upon it, a fortiori, if possible, is a
state tax, upon the carriage of merchandise from state to state.
Transportation is essential to commerce, or rather it is commerce
itself, and every obstacle to it, or burden laid upbn it by legislative
authority, is regulation: State FreihtTax Cases, 15 Wall. 281";
Welton v. The State of Missouri, 1 Otto 275; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418; Henderson v. Mayor of 2ew York, 2 Otto
259; and Ohy Lung v. Freeman, Id. 275. The two latter of
these cases refer to obstructions against the admission of persons
into a state, but the principles asserted are equally applicable to
all subjects of commerce.
We are thus brought to the question whether the Missouri statute
is a lawful exercise of the police power of the state. We admit
that the deposit. iii Congress of the power to regulate foreign commerce and commerce among the states was not a surrender of that
which may properly be denominated police power. What that
power is,it is difficult to define with sharp precision. It is generally -said to extend to making regulations promotive of domestic
order, morals, health and safety. As was said in -Thorp v. The
Rutland & Burlington Railroad Go., 27 Vt. 149, "it extends to
the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort and quiet of all
persons, and the protection of all property within the state. According to the maxim, Sic ittere tuo ut alienum non k6edas, which being of universal application, it must, of course, be within the range
of legislative action to define the mode and manner in which every
one may so use his own as not to injure others." It was further
said that by the'general police power of a state, " persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order
to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state;
of the perfect right of the legislature to do which no question ever
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was or upon acknowledged general principles ever can be made, so far
as natural persons are concerned." It may also be admitted that
the police power of a state justifies the adoption of precautionary
measures against social evils. Under it a state may legislate to
prevent the spread of crime, or pauperism, or disturbances of the
peace. It may exclude from its limits convicts, paupers, idiots and
lunatics, and persons likely to become a public charge, as well as
persons afflicted by contagious or infectious diseases; a right founded,
as intimated in the .Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, by GRIER, J.,
in the sacred law of self-defence: vide 3 Sawyer 283. The same
principle, it may also be conceded, would justify the exclusion of
property dangerous to the property of citizens of the state ; for example, animals having contagious or infectious diseases. All these
exertions of power are in immediate connection with the protection
of persons and property against noxious acts of other persons, or
such an use of property as is injurious to the property of others.
They are self-defensive.
But whatever may be the nature and reach of the police power
of a state, it cannot be exercised over a subject confided exclusively
to Congress by the federal constitution. It cannot invade the
domain of the national government. It was said in .Henderson
et al. v. Di e Mayor of New York et al., 2 Otto 272, to "be
clear, from the nature of our complex form of government, that
whenever the statute of a state invades the domain of legislation,
which belongs exclusively to the Congress of the United States, it
is void, no matter under what class of poweis it may fall, or how
closely allied it may be to powers conceded to belong to the states."
Substantially the same thing was said by Chief Justice 'ARSHALL
in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 210. Neither the unlimited powers
of a state to tax, nor any of its large police powers, can be exercised to such an extent as to work a practical assumption of the
powers properly conferred upon Congress by the constitution.
Many acts of a state may indeed affect commerce without amounting to a regulation of it, in the constitutional sense of the term.
And it is sometimes difficult to define the distinction between that
which merely affects or influences, and that which regulates or
furnishes a rule for conduct. There is no such difficulty in the
present case. While we unhesitatingly admit that a state may pass
sanitary laws, and laws for the protection of life, liberty, health
or property within its borders; while it may prevent persons and
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animals suffering under contagious or infectious diseases, or convicts, &c., from entering the state; while for the purpose of selfprotection it may establish quarantine and reasonable inspection
laws, it may not interfere with transportation into or through the
state, beyond what is absolutely necessary for its self-protection.
It may not, under the cover of exerting its police powers, substantially prohibit or burden either foreign or interstate commerce.
Upon this subject the cases in 1 Otto, to which we have referred, are very instriuctive. In Renderson v. Ie Mayor, fc.,
the statute of New York was defended as a police regulation
to protect the state against the influx of foreign paupers, but
it was held to be unconstitutional, because its practical result
was to impose a burden upon all passengers from foreign countries.
And it was laid down that "in whatever language a statute may
be framed, its purpose must be determined by its natural and
reasonable effect." The reach of the statute was far beyond its
professed object, and far into the realm which is within the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress. So in the case of My Lung v.
Freeman, where the pretence was the exclusion of lewd women.
but as the statute was more far-reaching and affected other immigrants, not of any class which the state could lawfully exclude,
we held it unconstitutional. Neither of these cases denied the
right of a state to protect herself against paupers, convicted criminals or lewd women by necessary and proper laws, in the absence
of legislation by Congress, but it was ruled that the right could
only arise from vital necessity, and tha: it could not be carried
beyond the scope of that necessity. These cases, it is true, speak
only of laws affecting the entrance of persons into a state; but the
constitutional doctrines they maintain are equally applicable to
interstate transportation of property. They deny validity to any
state legislation professing to be an exercise of police power for
protection against evils from abroad, which is beyon'd the necessity
for its exercise wherever it interferes with the rights and powers
of the federal government.
Tried by this rule, the statute of Missouri is a plain intrusion
upon the. exclusive domain of Congress. ' It is not a quarantine
law. It is not aniinspection law. It says to all natural persons
and to all transportation companies, "you shall not bring into the
state any Texas cattle or any Mexican cattle or Indian cattle
between March 1st and December 1st in any year, no matter'
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whether they are free from disease or not; no matter whether they
may do an injury to the inhabitants of the state or not; and if you
do bring them in, even for the purpose of carrying them through
the state without unloading them, you shall be subject to extraordinary liabilities."
Such a statute, we do not doubt, itis beyond
the power of a state to enact. To hold otherwise would be to
ignore one of the leading objects which the constitution of the
United States was designed to secure.
In coming to such a conclusion, we have not overlooked the decisions of very respectable courts in Illinois, where statutes similar
to the one we have before us have been sustained: Yeazcl v. Alexander, 53 Ill. 254. Regarding the statutes as mere police regulations, intended to protect domestic cattle against infectious disease,
those courts have refused to inquire whether the prohibition did
not extend beyond the danger to be apprehended, and whether,
therefore, the statutes were not something more than exertions of
police power. That inquiry, they have said, was for the legislature and not for the courts. With this we cannot concur. The
police power of a state cannot obstruct foreign commerce or interstate commerce beyond the necessity for its exercise; and under
color of it, objects not within its scope cannot be secured at the
expense of the protection afforded by the federal constitution. And
as its range sometimes comes very near to the field committed by
the constitution to Congress, it is the duty of the courts to guard
vigilantly against any needless intrusion.
The judgment of the Supreme Court must, therefore, be reversed
and the record remanded, with instructions to reverse the judgment
of the Circuit Court of Grundy county and to direct that court to
award a new trial.
Supreme Court of New York.
A. L. HELMBOLD v. THE H. T. HEL31BOLD MANUFACTURING CO.
A court of equity will never grant its protection to a trade-mark which expresses a falsehood, as against one which expresses the truth.
General words, the common property of English speaking people, cannot be
appropriated as trade-marks to the exclusion of others who may desire to use
them; and when therefore a man uses them in connection with his own name the
latter simply identifies his goods and is the only distinctive feature of the trademark.
In such a case the right to use his name is a personal right and does not pass to
his assignee by an adjudication in bankruptcy.
VOL. XXVI.-22
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A man's right to the use of his own name as a component part of a trade-mark
can only be interfered with when it is used fraudulently with intent to deceive the
public or to pirate upon the business of another.

The bill set forth that Henry T. HelmMfOTION. for injunction.
bold was the original manufacturer of an article known as "I. T.
Ueldnbold's Hlighly Concentrated Compound Fluid Extract of
Buchu," and that he continued such manufacture fot many years;
that on September 13th 1872 the said Ilelmbold was declared and
adjudicated a bankrupt, and on November 4th of the same year an
assignee in bankruptcy of his estate was appointed; that under
the order of the Bankrupt Court the title to and right to use the
name "I. T. Ileimbold's Highly Concentrated Compound Fluid
Extract of Buchu," in the manufacture and sale of the compound,
which had been acquired by said Henry T. Helnb'old through use,
became vested in such assignee, who, in turn, transferred it to the
plaintiff.
The plaintiff further claimed that from the year 1862 up to
March 1873, he manufactured the preparation which bore the
name hereinbefore stated, for his brbther, Henry T. Helmbold,
and for the assignee in bankruptcy, and since that date he has
manufactured it on his own account, using the aforesaid name and
the labels and wrappers which bad been used by the- said Henry
T. Helmbold.
The other facts fully appear in the opinion.
Ira

. Warren, for complainant.

George ff. Curtis, for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
WESTBROOK, J.-The wrapper or label around the bottle containing the preparation which the plaintiff vends, in addition to
the name indicating the article to be that of H. T. Helmb6ld, also
states as follows: "None genuine unless signed H. T. Helmbold."
"Principal depots for the sale of Helmbold's genuine preparations
at Hhelmbold's Temple of Pharmacy, Continental Hotel, and
Helmbold's Medical Depot, 101 -South Tenth street, Philadelphia.,
Pa." "Remarks-The quality and purity of these preparations
is guaranteed by the reputation acquired in many years' experience,
and also attention to business and the confidence and liberal
patronage of the medical faculty and the public. Both the fluid
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and other extracts have been admitted to use in the United States
army, and in all the state hospitals and public sanitary institutions,
as well as in private practice, arc in general demand as invaluable
remedies." "Directions for using Helinbold's genuine preparation
inside, printed in English, French, German and Spanish."
It will be observed that the effect of the label as used by the
plaintiff is to assure the public that the preparation put up by him
and which he charges to be "a useful and valuable article," is not
only the original medicine manufactured by H. T. Helmbold, but
that it is also prepared under the latter's personal supervision, and
its usefulness and efficacy are guaranteed by his personal reputation
and experience.
The defendant is a manufacturing company organized under the
laws of this state, of which Henry T. IIelmbold, the original compounder of the medicine which is the cause of dispute between the
parties to this action, was and is one of the co-partners; and such
company, by the aid and concurrence of said Henry T. HeImbold,
manufactures and puts up for sale an article also called "Henry T.
Hlelmbold's Highly Concentrated Compound of Fluid Extract."
Whilst the preparation of the defendant has the same name with
that of the plaintiff, and its sale and use are recommended by
printing upon the wrapper the same arguments and reasons which
the plaintiff's wrapper contains, yet such printing is in carmine
ink, and it professes not to be manufactured by the plaintiff or at
his establishment in Philadelphia, but by the defendant in the city
of New York.
No attempt has been made by the defendant to vend its article as
that manufactured by the plaintiff, but, on the contrary, the plaintiff complains that the defendant has warned the public against the
preparation of the plaintiff, upon the alleged ground that it was not
compounded according to the original Helmbold receipt. The answer is verified by Henry T. Helmbold, who has also made the
principal affidavit iii opposition to the injunction asked for by the
plaintiff.
Upon the facts which have been detailed, the first clear and conclusive answer to the application of the plaintiff for the injunction
restraining the defendants from using the name given to its preparation is, that the plaintiff's label is untrue, and the effect of granting the relief asked for would be the issue of an order of the court
prohibiting the use of a name and a wrapper which states the truth,
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for the benefit of one who uses a name and wrapper which convey
an untruth.
If what the plaintiff states upon the wrappers of 'his bottles containing the medicine, and which has been hereinbefore stated, is
remembered, it will appear, as has already been stated, 'that he
undertakes to sell his compound, not only under the name and
alleged trade-mark which Henry T. Helmbold formerly used, and
which lie still claims to use under and through the corporation with
which he is now connected, but upon a representation that said
Helmbold superintends personally its manufacture, and by his own
signature certifies to the genuineness of each bottle. This clearly
and confessedly is false, and the plaintiff is entitled to no protection
in a business carried on by means of untrue representati'ns and
statements.
As Henry T. Helmbold is personally employed with the defendant, and whatever value his personal care and supervision gives to
the defendant's business fairly belongs to itand not to the plaintiff,
an order of court should not suppress the publication of the truth
and allow the utterance of falsehood.
Whilst, for the reason, then, just given, the injunction asked by
the plaintiff must be refused, it seems equally clear that the plaintiff
acquired no title whatever to the so-called trade-mark by the proceedings in bankruptcy.
It is not denied that Henry T. Helmbold culd, by voluntary
sale and assignment, transfer the right to use his knowledge and
name, but it is not seen how the right to use his own knowledge
and name can be taken from him by any judicial proceeding whatever. If they can be, then the merchant who has become unfortu•nate, but who has still a knowledge and a name with which to begin
business anew, must, if he has been adjudged a bankrupt, be content to leave with his assets his brains and his character.
This is no over-statement of the case. Admitting that the plaintiff
has the -secret of the compound, which was once Henry T. Helmbold's alone (this, however, the latter most expressly denies), did
the decree of the bankrupt court transfer the sole right to use it to
the assignees in bankruptcy and thence to the plaintiff? This will
not be claimed; neither is it pretended that the mixture is not in
fact what its name declares, "A Fluid Extract of Buchu," the
right to make which and to declare by plain words in common and
general use the character of the mixture, must, in the absence of
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a patent protecting the process of manufacture, belong to any one
able to make the article and who desires to utilize his knowledge
by its preparation and sale. For example: A. could not compound
a fluid extract from coffee, and after its introduction to the public
as such an article, prevent B., who has the knowledge and skill
necessary to produce a similar extract, from using such knowledge
and skill and from employing suitable and ordinary words to inform
buyers truly as to its nature. If B. can, in such a case, be enjoined, then language in general use to express thought and to
convey information can be appropriated, and any one will then be
able to own words which are now the common property of all English speaking people. A trade-mark must, in a case like this, as
the term imports, be one consisting of a word- an expression, or a
mark invented or adopted by the owner, which designates and distinguishes his production from the general manufacture of the same
article, and it cannot be the appropriation of words belonging to
the general public which describe truly a known product. As
before stated, a particular process of manufacture may be owned
when the legal steps to acquire such ownership have been taken, or
a particular mark or name designating the manufacturer may by
use become the subject of protection, but words and phrases in common use describing truly an article offered to the, public cannot
become individual property any more than those generally employed
in life which must be used to make speech intelligible.
Assuming, then, that personal knowledge and the right to use
words truly descriptive of things cannot, by legal process, be taken
from an individual against his will, and without his voluntary surrender and assignment thereof, what remains of the plaintiff's case?
To a preparation of buchu, which was a drug well known by that
name, Mr. Henry T. Helmbold had given his own name as compounder thereof. This was its only distinctive feature. The
remainder of the so-called trade-mark consisted of words descriptive
of the compound, as.much so as "extract of sugar" or " extract of
lemon" would describe what was really the extract of either. Of
the right to use his own name in such a preparation, can he be
depiived ?
When applied to his own personal compound, his name simply
identifies his own goods. If any other person assumes it in a similar manufacture the law would protect him, because the public is
deceived and he is injured. The imposition and the injury enjoined
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come from the employment, not of a mere mark, the property
of another, but from the direct appropriation of a name identifying
a man and his own, to whom and his it can alone be applicable.
The name of a man is a part of his being, so indissolubly connected
with and attached to him that we fail to see how the one which
distinguishes and separates Henry T. Helmbold. from all mankind,and enables the public to know'him and that which h has prppared, can be taken from him and given to another, so that the
latter, by the use of such name, may vend and sell his own preparations as if they were those of the former. If this can be done,
then the law and the courts not only enable the quack and the
adventurer to impose their compounds and manufactures upon the
public under the disguise and cover of an honored name, but they
have, with the property of the unfortunate bankrupt, also appropriated and transferred his knowledge, skill and reputation. Is
this the policy of our bankrupt statutes ? If it is, then, instead
of beiiig a mode of relieving the debtor class, as well as a source
of protection to their creditors, every bankruptcy statute is a grave,
in which every hope and aspiration of the future of him who can
be subjected to its operation must be forever buried. Hitherto the
unfortunate being whose property has been swept away by the
vicissitudes of business has supposed his knowledge and reputation
were still' left to him as a capital for a new beginning. That
resource is"
now also gone, if the plaintiff in this cause is, right in
his claim, and the future of the bankrupt is shrouded in a darkness so thick and gloomy that not a single ray of light is left to
relieve its horrors. To the soundness of such a result this court
is unable to subscribe. The name of Henry T. Helmbold must
*still belong to him to whom his parents gave it. No law and no
court can take it from him. The property which he had acquired
belongs to his creditors, but the name, and whatever of character,
good or bad, belonging to it, and which he has hinself made, are
his, and must so continue to be until he voluntarily parts with
them. He has-'the right to make any extract he pleases, and to
tell the public by the use of his own name that the preparation is
his, and not that of another, and neither the plaintiff nor"any
other person can place that name upon a preparation not his,
against his will, and deprive him of the use thereof. Such act
would not only impose upon others, but be so cruel and outrageous
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toward him that, as it seems to me, no law and no court could
justify it.
The principle that a manufacturer can apply his own name to
his own creation was fully recognised by the Court of Appeals in
.fenelley v. .Menelley, 62 N. Y. 427. Though it was conceded
that the plaintiffs in that cause had succeeded to the business of
the original manufacturer (Andrew Menelley) of the famous Menelley bells, it was held that the defendant had the right to call all the
bells made by him by his own name (Menelley), provided he did
not so use that name as to make the public believe that his bells
were constructed by the plaintiffs. Such a use of his own name is
all that Henry T. Helmbold claims, and it is just such a use which
the plaintiffs would prevent and enjoin. The former does not seek
to impose upon the public his own mixture by giving them to
understand that it is the preparation of the latter; on the contrary,
he most carefully notifies the world that he, through the company
which bears his name and with which he is actively connected, and
not the plaintiff, manufactures the article which he offers for sale.
Unlike the defendant in 0roft v. Day, 7 Beavan 84, and in other
cases to be found, he sails under no false colors to the injury of the
public and the plaintiff, but plainly hoists his own, distinctly proclaiming that the preparation offered is his and not that of the
plaintiff. Indeed, so loudly and publicly has this proclamation, by
means of advertisements, been made, that one of the grounds of
complaint which the plaintiff has strenuously urged is, that Ienry
T. Helmbold is causing the world to believe that he and not the
plaintiff is that individual. In fact this cause is the exact opposite
of Croft v. Day, for while in that the complaint was that the defendant was causing the world to believe that he was the original Day
& M\artin, the famous blacking manufacturers, which was false. the
complaint in this is that the original and genuine Henry T. lhelmbold will not allow the plaintiff falsely to assume that individual's
name, and thus enable him (the plaintiff) to impose upon the public.
If a case founded upon such a position has either soundness or justice to commend it to the equitable power of this court, the discovery thereof has not been made by the judge to whom it was
presented.
For the reasons stated, the application of the plaintiff for an
injunction must be depied, with costs.
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Court of Appeals qf Kentucky.
KENTUCKY RIVER NAVIGATION CO. v.THE COMMONWEALTH
OF KENTUCKY.
A court of equity has power to specifically enforce a covenant to build or repair,
where, from the impossibility of estimating damages or-the danger of irreparable
loss, an action at law would be an inadequate remedy.
In such a case the iuiolvency of the tenant is no defence.
Forfeitures are not favored in equity, but there are cases where a rescission
of the contract may be decreed, although tle act or omission does not fall within
any express condition of forfeiture.
Such a case arises where the lessee of important and valuable works lias, in
breach of his covenant, allowed them to get out of repair and in danger of irreparable loss, and his insolvency prevents either an action for damages or a decree
for specific performance from being an adequate remedy. A forfeiture decreed
in this instance-for such reasons.
Where a statute gives a right and a remedy, the latter is exclusive of all other
remedies. But where the right exists independently of the statute, the remedy
given'by the latter is cumulative merely

BILL to forfeit and cancel a lease. The state being the owner
of certain public works for the improvement of the navigation
of the Kentucky river, leased the same to the plaintiff in error
for fifty years, with covenants on the part of the lessee to make
certain extensions and to keep the works in repair, &c. The case
had already been before this court in another form, and is reported
in 12 Bush 8. The facts upon which this bill was founded suffi'ciently appear in the opinion.
Alvin.Dtvall, for the appellant.
Thomas E. .M8s,, Attorney-General, for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
LINDSAY, 0. J., [After some remarks on the differen*% between
the present case and that reported in 12 Bush]-It is averred by
the Commonwealth that the company had permitted the improvements leased to and placed in its possession by the state to become
and remain out of repair to such an extent that one or more of the
locks and dams were in great and imminent danger of being washed
out and destroyed, and that it was making no attempt to repair and
preserve the improvements received under the lease, and was hopelessly insolvent and altogether unable to repair and preserve them.
The company, by its answer, "admits that several of the dams
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are in danger of destruction, but denies that the danger has resulted
from the fault of defendant, and says that the defendant has done
its best to avoid said danger and to keep said dams in repair."
It then says it " does not.know, nor has it sufficient information
to form a belief, whether it is insolvent or not; whether it is able
to put the dams leased it in repair or not; whether it is able to
extend slack-water improvements to the Three Forks or not. It
has subscriptions of stock made by the city of Louisville, and the
counties of Woodford, Jessamine, Clark, Madison, Estill and Owsley, for $500,000, which it is advised and believes are valid, provided that a city or county can, by a vote of its people, under
authority of an act of the legislature, make such subscriptions.
* * * This defendant believes they are valid, but has not sufficient
information to form a belief whether they will be judicially determined to be valid or not."
This is not a sufficient denial of the direct charge of insolvency.
The appellant does not pretend that it is not fully informed of all
the facts connected with these alleged subscriptions for stock, and
it cannot escape the effect of this knowledge by declining to form
an opinion as to whether, as matters of law, cities and counties can
make such subscriptions, or as to whether they will be judicially
determined to be valid. The provision of the Civil Code of Practice
tolerating such pleading does not and cannot be made to apply to
questions of law.. The Commonwealth's demurrer to this portion
of the answer of appellant should have been sustained.
Appellant received possession from the state of all the slack-water
improvements on the Kentucky river. The act under the authority
of which the lease was made provides that "the lessees shall keep
the said locks and dams in good repair at their own expense:" Sect.
2, chap. 1580, vol. 1, Sess. Acts 1869.
It is admitted in this case that these locks and dams are out of
repair, and that several of the dams are in danger of destruction,
and it is not denied that the company is insolvent and unable to
comply with the material provision, just quoted, of the act, in virtue of which the possession is held. Hence the question to be decided here is, whether this state of facts authorized the court below
to declare that the lease had determined, and that the officers and
agents of the Commonwealth were entitled to resume the possession
and control of the leased property ?
Whilst it may be conceded that the controlling purpose of the
VOL. XXVI.-23
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legislature in directing the Kentucky river improvements to be
leased, was to secure the completion of slack-water navigation to
the Three Forks, yet it is manifest the repair and preservation of
the existing improvements constituted, also a material, and to the
general public, a more important consideration than the extension
itself. And we may assume it was in this view, the act provided
that the lessees should keep the existing locks and dams in good
repair at their own expense.
If the company was solvent, and able to perform its covenant to
repair, and the character of the necessary repairs could be ascertained with a reasonable degree of certainty, a court of equity
would decree specific executi6n of the contract. In general, a covenant to repair or build will not be specifically enforced against the
lessee at the suit of the lessor, but to this general rule there are
recognised and indispensable exceptions.
We have here a case in which an action at law for the breach
of the covenant to repair would be an inadequate remedy to the
lessor, considered as the mere owner or proprietor of the leased
property, in view of the uncertainty of any estimate of damages
that could possibly be made, and no remedy at all for the injury
to the public resulting from the loss of the navigation of the river.
In such a case the chancellor may well interfere to prevent irreparable mischief. And his right to interfere by injunction or other
appropriate equitable remedy is recognised by Mr. Justice SToRY
in his works on Equity Jurisprudence (vol. 1, sects. 720 and 721)
and by Taylor on Landlord and Tenant (section 685).
Covenants to build were specifically enforced in the cases of
Storerv. The GreatTestern 1ailroadCo., 2 Y. & Coll. 48, and Stuyvesant v. TUie Mayor, 11 Paige 414. It is true these cases did
not arise out of controversies between lessors and lessees, but the
principles on which they rest are clearly applicable to contracts of
leasing.
If the Commonwealth had asked the alternative relief, either to
have the covenant to repair specifically enforced or the contract
rescinded, it would not have been a sufficient answer for the company to have set up its insolvency and utter inability to perform
its contract. Its pecuniary misfortunes cannot be allowed to defeat
the extension of slack-water improvements, and also to entail irreparable injury upon the Commonwealth. And as the appellee can
neither have specific performance nor compensation for the breach
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of the contract, it must have rescission or be left without any remedy at all.
Forfeitures of leases are not favored, and are not to be applied
except in very. extraordinary cases. Generally the lessor must be
content with compensation, even when the contract makes express
provision for re-entry on default of the tenant. But there are
extreme cases in which equity may decree rescission, although the
act or omission does not fall within any express condition of forfeiture: Claffin v. Scott, 7 Rob. (La.) 205.
The case under consideration is an extreme one. The lessee, it
is true, is not chargeable with wilful or intentional breach of contract, but its failure to rhpair, and its admitted insolvency, not only
defeat all the contemplated objects of the lease, but are also about
to result in the most ruinous consequences to the lessor and the
general public.
The character of the leased property, its uses to the public, the
purposes of the lease, and the consequences of the admitted default,
take this case without the general rule, and fully authorized the
chancellor to adjudge that the rights of the lessee had determined,
and that it was no longer entitled to retain the possession of the
leased property.
It is urged in opposition to this view, that the twelfth section of
the Act of February 24th 1869, provides a mode by which the state
may terminate the contract, and resume possession upon one year's
notice to the lessee, and after ascertaining and paying the full and
fair value of the improvements made under the terms of the lease,
and that this statutory remedy being specific and adequate, must be
taken to exclude all others. It is a correct rule of practice that
whenever a statute creates a right, and at the same time prescribes
a remedy, that remedy can alone be made available; but the right
of the Commonwealth to have this contract rescinded or annulled
for equitable reasons, does not grow out of or depend upon the statute. It is an incident to all such contracts as that entered into in
this case, and the right would be perfect and complete if the twelfth
section of the act had been omitted altogether.
The purpose of the twelfth section was not to enable the Co'mmonwealth to obtain relief against a defaulting lessee, but to authorize
it to terminate the contract, and resume possession of the property
in the mode prescribed, without establishing any ground of com-
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plaint, or assigning any reason, except that it chose, in the exercise
of its discretion, to take advantage of this reserved right.
That it might have pursued this course, instead of instituting this
action, we do not doubt; but having a right to relief in equity fer
the reasons heretofore considered, it was not bound to submit to the
delay incident to the remedy provided by the twelfth section, and
in the meantime take the risk of the destruction of the property
imperilled by the failure and inability of the lessee to perform its
covenant to repair.
It is also complained that the court below erred in adjudging the
possession of the leased property to the Commonwealth, without
passing upon the claim of the appellant 'for compensation for the
amount of money expended in improving the leased property in
excess of the tolls received. It is sufficient to say this claim was
not made the subject of a cross-action. It has not been litigated,
and if under all the circumstances it presents a ground for relief,
either at law or in equity, a matter about which we forbear to express
an opinion, the judgment here appealed from will interpose no
obstacle to its assertion in the future.
Being satisfied that said judgment does not in any way prejudice
the substantial rights of the appellant, and that it is fully warranted
by the principles of equity practice, it must be affirmed.
Supreme Court of Kansas.
ATCHISON AND NEBRASKA RAILROAD 00.v. WAGNER,
A bill of exceptions can be settled and allowed only by the judge, and when it
receives his signature it should be complete and nothing left to be settled by the
agreement, recollection or judgment of counsel, clerk or other person.
It is a record, and, like any other record, is not to be established by parol testimony, but must carry on its face the evidence of its own integrity and completeness.
While what is familiarly known as a skeleton bill, that is, a bill which provides
for the subsequent copying by the clerk into it, and as a part of it, some paper or
document is allowed, yet to make such a bill valid and complete these rules must
be regarded :(1) The bill, in referring to such paper or document, must purport to incorporate it into and make it part of the bill. A mere reference to it, although such
as to identify it beyond doubt, or a statement that it was in evidence, is not
sufficient.
(2) The document must itself, at the time of the signature of the bill, be in
existence, written out and complete.
(3) It must be annexed to the bill, and referred to as annexed, or it must be so
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marked by letter, number or other means of identification mentioned in the bill,
as to leave no doubt, when found in the record, that it is the one referred to in the
bill; and these means of identification must be obvious to all, so that any one
examining the record can know what document is to be inserted, or, after insertion, that the clerk has made no mistake.
Where, after all the testimony has been heard, but before the arguments have
commenced, one of the parties ascertains, or has good reasons to believe, that one
of his adversary's witnesses has been compelled by such adversary to testify falsely
against him, he is not obliged to wait until after the verdict and then seek a
remedy for the wrong by a motion for a new trial, but may immediately call the
attention of the court to the matter and have it investigated, and, if true, the fact
made known to the jury before retiring to consider of their verdict.
When the attention of the court is called to such a matter, it may investigate It
openly in the presence of the jury, or, in the first instance, privately and out
of the hearing of the jury. The latter is the preferable course, unless the fact
of such charge has in some way reached the ears of the jury, in which case it may
be-better that the jury know the entire truth, rather than render a decision with a
suspicion in their minds of something wrong.

ERROR from Atchison county. This was an action brought by
Wagner, the defendant in error, against the railroad for damages
for personal injuries arising from negligence. Judgment was
entered in the court below for plaintiff for $11,500.

W. W. Guthrie and B. F. Strihfellow, for plaintiff in error.
.Everest & Waggene&, for defendant in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BREWER, J.-There has been in this case an irritation and suspicion on the part of counsel which is both unfortunate and unpleasant. Passing by all the personal allusions and complaint in the
brief, we shall consider simply the legal questions involved.\ And
at the threshold we find on the part of defendant in error a challenge of substantially the whole record. In the transcript filed
with the petition in error appear three bills of exceptions, and a
motion was made to strike them out on the ground that they are
not copies of the bills as signed and now on file in the District
Court. Upon this motion the original bills were produced and
offered in evidence, together with much other testimony. The
bills, when signed, were what are sometimes called "skeleton bills,"
that is, with blanks containing directions to the clerk "here insert,
&c." Such bills it is claimed are nullities, and the clerk has no
power in copying to make the insertions, but must follow the very
letter of the bill as signed.
It is not disputed that the allowance of a bill of exceptions is
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the act of the trial judge. A paper purporting to be a bill of
exceptions if unsigned by him will not be noticed in the Supreme
Court: IVaysman v. Updegraff, McCahon 89; Cause of lPhll,
11 Kans. 455; Kshinka v. Cawker, 16 Id. 63. The agreements
of counsel are insufficient: Hodgclen v. Conz'rs, &c., 10 Kans. 637;
State v. Bolan, 18 Id. The certificate of the clerk will not answer:
McArtltur v. Mitchel, 7 Kans. 173; State v. Bolan, 18 Id. The
language of the statute is plain: "The party excepting must reduce
his exceptions to writing and present it to the judge for his allowance. If true, it shall be the duty of the judge to allow and sign
it :" General Statutes, p. 686, sec. 303.
It would seem to follow from this that when the bill receives the
signature of the judge it should be complete, and this we understand to be the substance and spirit of all the decisions.
There is to "be no further discussion, no further discretion; the
record is made. The office of a bill of exceptions is to bring upon
the record some portion of those proceeding5 which do not of right
and of course go upon the record: Stoner v. Jawk~on, 17 Kans.
607. It is itself a part of the record. But a record must speak
for itself; it must show upon its face all that it is. It must be its
own evidence of all that it contains. No part of its contents may
rest upon the discretion of .the clerk, the recollection of the judge
or the testimony of counsel. But to insure this certainty, it is
essential that everything lie written out in full, every document and
writing copied into the bill before signature. Such appears to be
the import of some of the authorities cited, but that seems to us
unnecessary stringency, and to impose needless clerical labor.
Where a deposition or other writing is to be made a part of a bill,
it can be referred to with such marks of identification as to exclude all
doubt. That surely ought to be sufficient, and so we think the better
authorities hold: .'B&t'these things must exist to exclude all doubt:
(1) The bill in referring to such extrinsic document must purport
to incorporate it into and make it a part of the bill. A mere refereuice
to a document, although such as to identify it beyond doubt, or a
statement that it was in evidence is not sufficient. For such reference and statement do not make it certain that judge or counsel
intended that it should be copied into and made a part of the bill.
(2) .The document must itself be in existence, written out and
complete at the time of the signature of the bill. Otherwise the
door is open for dispute as to its language, and the bill may not, in
fact, be allowed by the judge within the statutory time. A reference
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to the testimony of some witness to be thereafter written out by him
and as written out to be inserted, is improper, and such testimony,
though written out and inserted, must be disregarded, for that in
effect places in the bill the witness' statements of the testimony
and not the judge's.
So also if a document has been totally or partially destroyed, it
must be restored before the signature, and the paper as restored
clearly identified. And again, suppose a paper in a foreign language is received in evidence and translated to the jury by some
-witness on the stand, it will not do to refer to that paper in the original, leaving the translation to be thereafter written out by any one,
not even the witness who translated it to the jury, but the translation must be written out and properly referred to, so that the judge
may approve it as the one given on the trial. The same principle
renders it proper that short-hand notes be written out before the
signature, for the notes of the stenographer are not a record; they
are not conclusive as to what in fact was the testimony; they are
not good against the certificate of the judge and are no substitute
for it. Whatever reliance the judge may place upon such notes, he,
after all, must determine what was alid what was not the testimony,
and until those notes are written out neither he nor counsel can
determine what they will show as the testimony.
(3) And in this we appropriate the language of the Supreme
Court of the United States in the case of Leftwieh v.Leeann, 4
Wall. 187, in which the court says: "If a paper which is to constitute a part of a bill of exceptions, is not incorporated into the body
of the bill, it must be annexed to it or so marked by letter, number
or other means of identification mentioned in the bill, as to leave no
doubt when found in the record that it is the one referred to in the
bill of exception-;."

And these means of identification must be obvious to all. No
mere memorandum, intelligible, it may be, to a single person, even
the clerk, -but indicating nothing to any one else, will be sufficient.
They must be such that any one going to the recQrd can determine
what document is to be inserted, or after insertion that the clerk
has made no mistake. The record must prove itself and not the
record and the testimony of the clerk. The clerk changes; the
record endures. And long after judge and clerk are both gone,
the record, if good, must carry on itself the evidence of its own
integrity.

ATCHISON & N. RAILROAD CO. v. WAGNER.

It may be well to notice some of the vast number of authorities
cited by counsel. In the case of .eed v. Hubbard, 1 Iowa (G,
Greene) 153, the bill of exceptions recited that the plaintiff exhib--:
ited his bill of particulars-here insert the same-and the court
sustained a motion to strike out the bill of particulars as copied by
the clerk. See also Humphrey v. Burge, 1 Iowa 223.
In the case of Harmon v. Chandler, 3 Iowa (Clark) 152, the
court say: "In order to bring before this court, as a part of the
record, any paper used or proceeding had in the District Court, not
made a part of the record by statute, it must be embodied in the
bill of exceptions, or so plainly identified that there cannot possibly
be any mistake as to what is referred to." To refer to a motion or
instruction as marked "A," and here insert it, "is not sufficiently
certain for the ends of justice." See also Jordon et al. v. Quick,
11 Iowa 9; State ex rel. v. Jones et al., Id. 11; State v. Larkin,
11 Nevada 314; RNarbaugh v. Judge, 32 Mich. 259; Wadker v.
Stoddard, 31 Mo. 123; Oliver v. Town et al., 24 Wis. 514. In
the case of Sexton et al. v. Willard et al., 27 Wis. 465, 468, the
court say: "The bill of exceptions on file is imperfect and incomplete on its face. Blanks are left in it for various depositions and
other documents, which it states were read in evidence on the
trial, and no reference is made to them or description of them given
by which they can be identified. The attorneys might differ as to
the identity of these and there would be no means of settling the
controversy. They should have been inserted in the bill or made part
of it by certain reference, in order that no such dispute may arise."
In the case of Hicks v. Person, 19 Ohio 446, the court say:
"All the evidence before the jury must be embodied in or made a
part of a bill of exceptions. It will not do, as is sometimes
attempted t6 le -done, to refer to the.records of courts or records
of deeds and attempt to make them parts of bills. of exceptions.
It will not do to refer to depositions on, file by the names of the
defendants, or by artificial marks upon the depositions themselves,
without something beyond this. They must be attached to or made
a part of the bill of exceptions, so that when a record of the case
shall be made they can be introduced into that record as constituting a part of the case." And further, Wells v. iartin, 1 Ohio
St. 388; Busby v. Finn, Id. 409; Young v. State, 23 Id. 578;
Stewart v. Rankin et al., 39 Ind. 161; KYesler v. Myers, 41 Id.
546; State v. Bailroad Co., 44 Id. 350; Vanderkarrv. State, 51
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Id. 91; Cofznzissioner8 of Henry County v. Slatter, 52 Id. 171;
Everett v. Gooding, 53 Id. 72.
In the case of aarlington v. Jones, 37 Ala. 240, the court,
speaking of papers not copied into the bill of exceptions, but made
part thereof by reference, say that they must "be described by
such identifying features as to leave no room for mistakes in the
transcribing officer." Strawbridge v. The State, 48 Ala. 308;
Tuskaloosa Go. v. Logan, 50 Id. 503; Huff v. Gilbert, 4 Blackf.
19; Sparks v. Clark, 6 Id. 167; Virginia University v. Embree,
7 Id. 461.
Applying the rules above given to the case at bar, what is the
result ? Bill of exceptions No. 3 is the one purporting to preserve
the testimony taken on the trial. In the original bill of exceptions,
as -allowed and signed by the trial judge, the only identification
of the evidence offered by plaintiff is as follows:"As will appear from a stenographic record thereof as follows.
(Here copy record of testimony as kept by stenographer down to
resting of plaintiff's case.)"
"The said depositions taken by plaintiff, to wit. (Here copy
names of witnesses and depositions a. read.)"
And the only identification of evidence offered by the defendant
to be inserted in said bill of exceptions is as follows :"Defendant, to maintain the issue upon his part, offered evidence
which was received by the court of the kind and in order as follows,
as also kept by such stenographer; (Here copy defendant's evidence)." And the evidence of plaintiff in rebuttal is not even identified by the stenographic record, but it is stated that." the plaintiff
offered evidence in rebuttal which was received by the court as
follows: (Here copy evidence in rebuttal)."
Among the papers brought from the office of the clerk of the
District Court and offered in evidence on the motion is a large roll
which, upon examination, reads as the testimony of witnesses given
upon this trial, and which appears to have been copied into the
transcript filed in this court as the testimony referred to in the
original bill. But upon this roll we find no file marks or other
mark of identification. From an examination of this roll no one
could tell when it was placed among the papers of the clerk's office
or even when it was written out, and if the clerk had produced any
other roll or paper reading as testimony given upon that trial no
one bould from inspection have told whiph was correct or which was
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intended to be inserted, or which, if either, was written out by a
stenographer. Indeed, the only meanis of identification which appear are the "facts that it reads as testimony given upon the trial
and that it is found among the papers of the case. To hold such
means sufficient would open the door to the loosest practice. Again,
as a part of plaintiff's eidence the original bill directs "here copy
names of witnesses and depositions as read." Who is to decide
what depositions were read? The court certainly by signing such
a bill does not determine. It is a matter to be thereafter settled,
and by whom ? Still again, the only identification of rebutting
testimony is "here copy evidence in rebuttal." Whence is the
clerk to get it? Who is to decide what was then given in evidence?
Such a direction settles nothing. It does not even purport to settle
anything. We have refrained thus far from noting anything outside of that which appears upon the face of the papers, fbr we think,
as indicated heretofore, that the identification mizst be apparent from
the record itself and obvious to all. In reference to the extrinsic
testimony, of which we received quite an amount on the hearing
motion, subject to further consideration as to its competency, we
simply say this : That its contiadictions only enforce the conviction
that the record must be tried by itself; that the marks of identification must be on the papers and in the record; and make it painfuliy certain that it would be in the highest' degree dangerous to
trust to the recollections of clerk or counsel or court. So fir, then,
as the motion refers to that portion of the bill of exceptions No. 3,
which purports to give the testimony on the trial it inust be sustained. Notwithstanding this we have examined the testimony at
length and without asserting that there were absolutely no errors
committed we think that a verdict for the plaintiff tpon such evidence would have to be sustained. There was more evidence to
sustain fhe verdict, more tending to show -negligence on th6 part of'
the defendant than in many of the contested cases that come to this
court. We do not mean that the testimony was one-sided entirely,
for there was abundance of strong conflicting testimony. But still
as to the matters of fact the verdict of the jury would have had to be
sustained, and a reversal, if ordered, must have been on some technical error in the admission of evidence or in the instructions. As
to the amount of the verdict it was unquestionably excessive, but
whether it was so excessive that, for that reason alone, after lving
been approved by the District Court, we should have felt compelled
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to reverse the judgment, is a matter we shall not decide. Perhaps
the justices might not agree upon that.
Two motions were made to suppress certain depositions, taken
respectively on the 1st anrd 3d of May 1875, and the 21st of October 1875. As to the first depositions, the grounds assigned were
that they were taken before P. S. Noble, a clerk of the plaintiff's
attorneys, and that they were so taken without notice to, and in the
absence of, defendant's attorney; and as to the other, the grounds
were that they were taken in short-hand and afterwards written out
and signed by the witnesses, and also that they were taken before
said Noble. Upon the face of the depositions everything appears
correct. The objections are raised only by extrinsic testimony. -In
support of these objections the affidavits of two witnesses were filed.
They were opposed by counter affidavits. These counter affidavits
show that the taking of the depositions in short-hand and before
P. S. Noble was by consent of parties; that Noble, though a clerk
of plaintiff's attorneys, had no interest in this suit and was not
attorney or relative of either party, and was, as a notary public, in
the habit of taking depositions for the different attorneys of Atchison, for his own benefit and not for the gain of the plaintiff's
attorneys.; and also that the notice to take tlie first depositions
was served on one of the principal officers of the defendant, and
that T. MNI.
Pierce, an attorney in the office of defendant's attorney,
though not regularly employed in this case, appeared at the time
named as attorney for defendant, and cross-examined the witnesses
without any objection on account of the notice. The motion to
suppress states that Pierce was employed specially by the defendant
to appear and object on account of the notice. Upon the questions
of fict raised by the various affidavits, we cannot see that there was
such a clear preponderance of testimony against the ruling of the
District Court as will justify a reversal. Again, it does not affirmatively appear that all the testimony presented on the motion is
preserved in the record: Melntosh v. Cawford Cauntl Comrni8sioners, 13 Kans. 171.
We cannot forbear noticing at this point a matter which seems to
have escaped the attention of counsel and which tends to -how how
uncertain "skeleton bills" of exception are even in their best estate.
The skeleton bill, after referring to the motions, states that in support thereof defendant read "two certain affidavits as follows:
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(Here copy two first affidavits made by W. W. Guthrie and T. 1.
Pierce)." The transcript filed with us shows at this place two affidavits of these gentlemen, of date November 10th. Further on the
skeleton bill reads: "Plaintiff then read contra certain affidavits of
B. P. Waggener, P. S. Noble and A. H. Horton, which are copied
as follows: (Here copy such affidavits)." The transcript here shows
three affidavits of these three gentlemen respectively. The bill
then further reads: "Defendant then read contra the certain other
affidavits of Guthrie and Pierce, which are copied as follows: (Here
copy such affidavits)." And the transcript shows two such affida-vits of date November 12th. Then, a.ccording to the bill come the
depositions themselves, which were sought to be suppressed, but in
the transcript there appears two more affidavits of P. S. Noble and
one of B. P. Waggener, and which, upon their face, refer to the matters in the motion, and which are also verified on the 12th of November. Now, were these last affidavits really read upon the motion ?
Was it intended that they should be inserted in the bill of exceptions as copied for this court, or was this simply the act of the clerk
or copyist, thinking they ought to be in ?- So also where it is said
that 'plaintiff read the certain affidavits of B. P. Waggener, &c., and
the direction was to copy such affidavits, was it intended, that the
clerk should copy one affidavit apiece of these gentlemen, or all
affidavits of theirs he might find on -file before the date of the motion,
or only such as, upon examination, -hemight deem pertinent to the
matters in the motion, or such as according to his memory were
actually read? These questions find no satisfactory answer in the
record. The transcript as it comes before us is doubtless correct;
at any rate we may presume it to be so, as no question is made, but
if it were challenged we should be at a loss from anything in the
original bill to determine how many affidavits were properly copied
into the record by the clerk.
One other matter remains for consideration. After the testimony
was all in, the court adjourned for the arguments to the ensuing
morning. At that time, before the jury had been called, but while
they were present in the court room, and in their hearing, the counsel
for plaintiff produced and read to the court an affidavit stating substantially that since the adjournment, one of defendant's employees
and witnesses bad admitted that the testimony that he bad given adverse to the plaintiff he had been forced to give; that he knew he had
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done wrong and done the plaintiff injustice and that he was sorry
for it. Upon this, and before proceeding further with the case,
the witness and the parties who claimed to have heard his admissions were brought into court, questioned and cross-questioned as to
the admission. When all had been so examined, the court, without
taking any action on the matter so investigated, directed the argument to proceed. It is claimed that this was both "misconduct of
the prevailing party," and "irregularity in the proceedings of the
court and the prevailing party, by which the defendant was prevented from having a fair trial," and resulted in ajudgment excessive
and outrageous in the last degree. It was neither. The attention
of the court was called by affidavits to a matter which demanded
investigation. It was proper, too, to investigate it before the case
was finally submitted to the jury, and while a private examination
before the court and out of the hearing of the jury would ordinarily,
at least in the first instance, be the preferable course, we cannot
think that the fact of its publicity and the presence of the jury,
turned it in this case into misconduct or irregularity sufficient to
compel the reversal of the judgment. Suppose it were true that
defendant had forced one of his employees to go into court and so
testify against the plaintiff as to do him injustice and wrong; that
would be of course niisconduct, and sufficient, if not discovered
until after verdict to compel a new trial. But if discovered before
the case goes to the jury, must the party wait until after verdict
and then seek to remedy the wrong by motion for a new trial ?
That often would be far from adequate remedy. It involves necessarily delay, and all that results or may result from delay; waste
of time, expense, annoyance, absence of witnesses, failing of memory, insolvency of defendant are more or less certain consequences
of a new trial. Besides, no jury can so fully appreciate the extent
and force of the wrong, as that which has heard the testimony by
which the wrong was sought to be perpetrated. While, therefore,
a party may wait until after verdict and seek to remedy the wrong
by motion for a new trial, he is not compelled to so wait, and may,
immediately upon discovering the fact call the attention of the court
to it. On the other hand, if it be misconduct for a party to force
an employee to testify untruly, it is no less misconduct for the
opposite party to maliciously fabricate such a charge, and if the
plaintiff had made such a charge, and circulated it so as to come to
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the ears of the jury in any other manner than by directly and openly
calling the attention of the court to and demanding an investigation of it, it would be misconduct. And more, although openly
presented to the court and investigation demanded, if it should
appear that it was wholly without foundation, and made without
any reasonable grounds therefor, that would also seem to be misconduct. But where the charge is true, or there are reasonable
grounds to believe it true, the party is guilty of no misconduct in
coming directly and openly into court and demanding an investigation, in order that his rights may be protected against such a
wrong.
In this case the testimony was conflicting, and we do not think
the charge was established, but still, from the language which the
witness admitted that he had used, to the effect "that he had to go
to the court and testify," it is not strange that the plaintiff and his
friends understood that the compulsion referred to was that of the
employer, and not of the law. The charge was not wantonly
brought. The plaintiff believed it. There were some grounds for
believing it. It was apparently made in good faith, and there was
no misconduct in making it.
Ordinarily, as we have said, such matters should first be investigated privately before the court, and not in the hearing of the
jury, in order' that their attention may not be distracted to side
issues ; but still whether it shall be so had or not is a matter largely
within the discretion of the court. The charge may have become
so public that there is a probability of its having reached the ears
of the jury. In such a case the interests of justice and the rights
of both parties would seem to demand that they should know the
exact truth rather than return a verdict with a suspicion of wrong
in their minds. In the case before us it does not seem that the public investigation of the charge was such an error or wrought such
prejudice to the rights' of the defendant as would justify any interference with the judgment.
Judgment affirmed.
HORTON, 0. J., having been of counsel, did not sit in this case.
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Sulreme Court of Tennessee.
COLBURN

ET AL.

v. MAYOR OF CHATTANOOGA.

Where the autborities of a municipal corporation are proceeding to do an act
which is ultra rires and which will impose on a taxpayer an unlawful increase
of tax, he may file a bill in equity, in his own name, to enjoin the act. The concurrence of the attorney-general, or other representative of the public, is not
indispensable.
In such a case a court of equity has power to enjoin the issue of illegal evidences
of debt by the corporate officers.
Corporate powers are to be strictly construed, and unless clearly given in the
charter or by statute, no authority exists in a municipal corporation to issue scrip
or warrants on the treasurer, in the form of promises to pay at a future day, for
the purpose of paying the ordinary expenses of the municipality.

Tirs was a bill filed by complainants in behalf of themselves and
other taxpayers of the city of Chattanooga, to enjoin the mayor and
aldermen from issuing any scrip, treasury warrants, currency note,
bill or other evidence of debt, until legal authority should be first
obtained for so doing.
The bill alleged that by an Act of the General Assembly of
March 20th 1873, entitled "An Act to provide for the issuance of
bonds by the cities," it is provided that in'no case shall the authorities of cities having more than eight thousand and less than iwenty
thousand inhabitants, issue bonds or other evidences of debt until
authorized by a two-thirds vote of the qualified voters of such city,
at an election held for that purpose ; and when duly authorized so
to do, by an election held as aforesaid, such authorities are empowered to issue bonds or evidences of debt not exceeding $100,000 in
addition to the debts outstanding at the time of the passage of said
act ; that in violation of the said act the defendants were issuing
evidences of debt, consisting of warrants on the treasurer, drawn by
the mayor and countersigned by the recorder, currency 'warrants,
due in one and three years, which are promissory notes, having the
form and general appearance of bank bills; that the treasury warrants are payable in city scrip ; that by this creation of debts the
defendant has greatly depreciated the credit of the city, &c., and
praying that defendants be required to state the amount of such evidences of debt issued, &c., and be enjoined from further issue without lawful authority.
The defendants, after a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction
of iubject-matter and parties, which was overruled by the court,
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answered, stating the amount of the city debt; the amount of scrip

issued; that they had issued the scrip under the authority of and
for the purpose specified in the municipal charter, and to accomplish
the objects of their incorporation, and for providing for the payment of the debts and expenses of the city; that upon the coming into office of the present board, they found no money in the
treasury and a large outstanding indebtedness, and being deprived by the action of the General Assembly of the state of the
power to enforce the collection of taxes for the years 1874-75,
they issued warrants and scrip, .believing such a course to be
necessary to the maintenance of the city government, and for the
best interests of the people; that they have the right to issue warrants upon their treasury, whether they have money therein or not,
and the right to issue scrip, and that the credit of the city is depreciated, not by any illegal creation of debt, but by the action
of the legislatuire suspending the colle~oion of taxes.
The form of the scrip issued was as follows:"State of Tennessee [1].
One year after date the Board of Mayor and Aldermen of the
city of Chattanooga will pay one dollar to bearer.
THOMAS TAYLOR, Mayor.

Auditor."
And endorsed: "This note is receivable for all taxes and other
dues of the city on presentation."
The cause was heard upon the bill, answer and exhibits, and an
injunction granted, and defendants appealed to this court.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
LEA, Special J.-The first question presented by the case for our

determination is, had the chancery court jurisdiction of the subject
and of the municipal conduct cf the defendant by bill filed by a taxpayer? It is insisted for the defendants that illegal acts, such as
defendants are charged with, affect the whole public, and the public
must, by its authorized officers, institute the proceeding to prevent
or redress the illegal act, and that therefore the attorney-general
was the proper person to file this bill; and we are referred to the
reports of several states thus holding. The better and more universal doctrine is that any taxpayer may bring his bill in equity to
prevent the corporate authorities from acting ultravires, where the
effect will be to impose on him an unlawful tax, or to increase his

COLBURN v.MAYOR OF CHATTANOOGA.

193

burden of taxation: 2 Dillon on Mun. Corp., sect. 731, says: "In
this country the right of property h'older8 or taxable inhabitants to
resort to equity to restrain municipal corporations and their officers
from transcending their lawful powers, or violating their legal duties
in any mode which will injuriously affect the taxpayers, such as
making an unauthorized appropriation of the corporate funds, or
an illegal disposition of the corporate property, or levying and collecting void and illegal taxes and assessments upon real property
* * * has been affirmed or recognised in numerous cases in many
of the states. It can, perhaps, be vindicated upon principle, in
view of the nature of the powers exercised by municipal corporations
and the necessity of affording easy, direct and addquate preventive
relief against their abuse. It is better that those immediately
affected by corporate abuses should be armed with the power to
interfere directly in their own names, than to compel them to rely
upon the actions of a distant state officer."
The action of the chancellor, therefore, in overruling the motion
to dismiss the bill for want of jurisdiction was proper. The charter
of the city of Chattanooga provides that the corporation "shall have
full power to borrow money on its bonds for any object that its authorities may determine to be important to the promotion of its
welfare, and is not made improper by exist.ng law, provided that
the sum borrowed under the provisions of this section shall not exceed the sum of $50,000, without being specially authorized to do
so by a majority of the qualified votes of said city."
The unconstitutionality of the Act of March 20th 1873 has been
argued with great earnestness, because the caption of the act does
not state the subject of the act, and because it repeals the section
just quoted from the charter of incorporation of the city of Chattanooga. In the view we have taken of this case, it is immaterial
whether said act is constitutional or unconstitutional, or whether it
repeals any part of the charter or not. Neither by the Act of
March 20th 1873, nor by the charter has the corporation any power
to issue warrants on the treasurer, or city scrip, for the purpose of
raising money for the ordinary expenses of the corporation. Warrants on the treasurer may be given by an authorized officer to pay
money, but only as evidences to him that the debts had been audited
by the properly authorized officers of the body, and serve as vouchers to him for his disbursements: Mayor and Council of _Nashville
v. _Hsher et al., Supreme Court of Tennessee, not yet reported. If
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